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Review of Hannah Ginsborg’s The Normativ i ty  o f  Nature .  Essays on Kant’s  
Cri t ique o f  Judgement (OUP, 2015) 
 
Michela Massimi, University of Edinburgh 
 
Kant’s Critique of Judgement has long been at the centre of interpretive debates among 
Kant scholars. With a first part dedicated to aesthetics and a second part focused on 
teleology, Kant’s third Critique has traditionally posed a puzzle to Kant’s interpreters: 
namely, how to reconcile the two parts, and where to locate the underlying unity of the 
overall project. This seeming lack of unity has often led Kant scholars to a selective 
engagement with the third Critique. Kant’s aesthetics and Kant’s reflections on teleology 
have often attracted the attention of distinct, and somehow orthogonal scholarly 
communities, with only a few exceptions. 
Hannah Ginsborg is one such exception. Over the past two decades, Ginsborg has 
elaborated a sophisticated interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Judgement that brings 
together aesthetics, cognition, and teleology under a thoroughgoing normative reading of 
Kant’s project. The wonderful book The Normativ i ty  o f  Nature collects fourteen 
essays by Ginsborg produced over a twenty-five year span. The book is structured in 
three Parts: Part I Aesthetics, Part II Cognition, and Part III Teleology. In what follows, 
I concentrate my attention on two salient and representative aspects of Ginsborg’s 
interpretive stance. 
The five essays in Part I tackle the central dilemma that besets Kant’s aesthetics: 
namely, how it is possible for our aesthetic judgments to ‘demand universal assent’ while 
also being subjective. In other words, how it is possible for aesthetic judgments to have 
universal validity, given that they are based on a subjective feeling of pleasure (e.g. my 
own feeling of pleasure when I make the judgment: “Botticelli’s La primavera is 
beautiful”). Ginsborg considers and rejects some prominent views to this effect (from 
Ameriks to Guyer, among others), which in different ways have provided possible 
answers to this central dilemma. Key to Ginsborg’s approach is the rejection of any 
objective take on aesthetic judgments, i.e. the temptation to read aesthetic judgments as 
based on a so-to-speak dispositionalist reading of how beautiful objects may trigger in us 
a universally shared aesthetic response. She also rejects Guyer’s influential two-acts view, 
whereby aesthetic response and aesthetic judgment are two separate and distinct 
moments.  
Ginborg argues instead that the central dilemma in Kant’s aesthetics can be 
resolved if we come to view judgments of taste as akin to cognitive judgments in 
demanding universal assent. The main difference between the two kinds of judgments—
as Ginsborg sees it—is the following. The universal validity of cognitive judgments is 
based on everyone’s sharing the same empirical concept under which spatio-temporal 
manifold gets subsumed—so that we collectively come to judge an object in a specific 
way (e.g. when I judge that “This stone is heavy”). By contrast, the universal validity 
displayed by aesthetic judgments is not based on any similar activity of subsuming spatio-
temporal manifold under a specific empirical concept. Aesthetic judgments manifest 
instead an ‘exemplary necessity’ based on a free play of the faculties of imagination and 
understanding. In aesthetic judgments, imagination exercises a lawfulness (Gesetzmäßikeit) 
“characteristic of understanding, yet in a way which is at the same time ‘free’ or ‘without 
a law’ (CJ, First Remark on the First Section of the Analytic, 5:240–1” (Ginsborg, op. cit, 
p. 54).  
Ginsborg identifies this exemplary necessity of aesthetic judgments with normative 
necessity. Under this normative reading, we would acquire the ability of judge objects as 
beautiful by forming perceptual images and synthesizing them as they ought to be 
synthesized. This rule-governed synthesizing activity does not require any previous grasp 
of any rule or specific empirical concept. It displays instead a ‘free lawfulness’ of 
imagination, akin to a Wittgensteinian rule-following. We learn how to judge Botticelli’s 
La primavera as beautiful, or to judge an organism as a tree, or as a dog, or else, in a way 
analogous to the way in which we learn how to speak our native tongue (i.e. by following 
rules without antecedently grasping these same rules until much later in life, when we 
learn grammar in school). This ‘primitive’ normativity, as Ginsborg calls it, brings along 
with it a kind of exemplary necessity, very different from the necessity typically associated 
with the constitutive activity of the understanding. For no specific rules or antecedently 
grasped concept is here involved, by contrast with the synthesizing activity of the faculty 
of determining judgment.  
Primitive normativity in judging an object as it ought to be judged provides also the 
seemingly missing link between Kant’s aesthetics and Kant’s teleology, under Ginsborg’s 
reading of the third Critique. In the case of aesthetic judgments, the normativity has to 
do with the relation between the object and our cognitive faculties, i.e. our judging the 
object as it ought to be judged; namely, we take our cognitive faculties to be functioning as 
they ought with respect to the object. In the teleological judgments, instead of thinking 
of how our cognitive faculties ought to be functioning with respect to the object, or how 
the object ought to be judged by us, we think instead of how the object ought to be tout 
court. Our ability to judge organisms as natural (as opposed to products of art), and yet as 
purposive, should not be understood as implying a designer, Ginsbog warns us. For Kant 
is adamant in rejecting the inference from the purposiveness of nature to God (or other 
minds) as the designer of nature. Instead, our ability to judge an organism as having a 
function (e.g. the heart has the function to pump blood), and hence as purposive, is 
nothing but our ability to judge the organism in normative terms. Not surprisingly, we 
take some organisms (e.g. the drosophila) as ‘model organisms’ (as contemporary 
philosophers of science would call them) for kind membership. Ginsborg develops in 
details her account of primitive normativity in Part III of the book, in the context of the 
broader discussion of how to understand biological regularities as lawlike.  
The lawlikeness of biological phenomena poses an obvious problem for Kant’s 
natural science. For it cannot be explained mechanically, i.e. in terms of Kant’s 
fundamental forces of attraction and repulsion, the same two fundamental forces from 
which Kant (pre-Critical and Critical) appealed to in the explanation of a variety of 
physical phenomena (from the formation of planets to the cause of the winds). The 
complexity and regularity of organisms in nature requires instead a principle of 
purposiveness of nature, which Ginsborg understands as “normative lawlikeness without 
design” (essay 11): “to regard something as a purpose is to regard it as subject to 
normative laws, standards, or constraints” (op. cit, p. 275); “it is thus to think (…) that 
there is a way it ought to be; yet without invoking the thought of an intelligent producer 
whose actions are governed by the idea that it ought to be that way” (p. 277). Thus, the 
regularities displayed by living organisms can be regarded as lawlike (despite their 
mechanical inexplicability) because they conform to normative constraints and standards. 
Acorn ought to grow into oaks, and tadpoles into frogs—it is this normative ought that 
Kant’s idea of natural purposiveness is meant to capture.  
Ginsborg’s interpretive analysis of the Critique of Judgement is masterful, thought-
provoking, and timely. It has the capacity of bringing unity to a seemingly disunified 
corpus of Kant’s reflections on aesthetics and teleology. It is attentive to Kant’s text 
without ever being exegetical. It is an essential contribution to contemporary trends on 
normativity, as much as it speaks to contemporary debates in aesthetics and philosophy 
of biology too. This is Kant scholarship at its best.  
In philosophy of biology, debates on ‘function’ in biology, on model organisms, 
and on the status of laws continue to animate lively discussions.1 Most contemporary 
discussions on biological regularities and organisms are not cashed out in terms of 
normative rules or standards, but in terms of mechanisms. After all, biological regularities 
are rife with exceptions, and involve very sophisticated mechanisms to the point that 
disfunctions (such as pathological amino acids sequencing at work in cancer) are often as 
lawlike as normal cell functions. And the explanatory burden does not often lie on laws 
as such, but on the specific mechanisms at work in the relevant phenomenon we are 
interested in studying.2 The contemporary vast literature on mechanisms in philosophy 
of biology is still to establish how entities (e.g. APC gene) and their activities (e.g. cell 
growth) combine to form the explanatory mechanisms we associate with, say, the origin 
of colorectal cancer, among many other relevant phenomena. Some philosophers of 
science (e.g. Cartwright) use the word “constitutive” to designate how entities and 
activities combine into well-defined mechanisms. Perhaps, Ginsborg’s primitive 
normativity comes closer. Biological regularities may be regarded as due to mechanisms 
(irreducible to the sheer physical laws of inorganic matter) that display rules or norms for 
the kind of activities (e.g. cell growth) involving specific entities (e.g. APC gene). 
Understanding the lawfulness of living organisms then means unearthing the rule-
governed behavior of such entities in given conditions and environments, without yet 
knowing in advance or having antecedently grasped the rules themselves governing such 
behavior. This is the exemplary necessity at work in the lawfulness of the contingent 
realm of living organisms. After all, it is not the rule itself, but the rule-governed 
behavior that matters most. Studying defective organisms is often the best way of 
investigating such rule-governed behavior. Contemporary biomedical research is 
precisely of this nature. Credit should be given to Ginsborg’s careful reading of the third 
Critique for unraveling so far unexplored possibilities in Kant’s legacy for contemporary 
debates in the life sciences, among many others.  
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  See for example A. Levy (2014) “What was the Hodgkin and Huxley’s achievement?” British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science 65, 469-492; E. Kingma (2015) “Situation-specific disease and dispositional function”, 
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, first published online January 2015; R. Ankeny and S. Leonelli 
(2011) “What’s so special about model organisms?”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 42, pp. 313-
323; S. Mitchell (2003) “Laws”, Biological Complexity and Integrative Pluralism (CUP), ch. 5. 
2 For example, researchers investigate how amino acids sequencing maps onto functional domains, such as 
oligomerization and catenin binding I. And how anomalous sequencing maps onto diseases, such as 
polyposis, in the mechanisms underlying the germline mutations of the APC gene responsible for 
colorectal cancer, for example.   
